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Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute: Effect of
Forfeiture Provisions on Third Parties
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, concerned with the problem of drug abuse in the United
States,' Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act.2 In an effort aimed at discouraging large
scale drug operations entered into for profit, Congress included a
provision in the Act entitled "Continuing Criminal Enterprise"
(CCE). Among other things, this section provides that any person
who is found guilty of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise'
must forfeit any profits derived from the enterprise along with any
other interest stemming from the enterprise.5
1. H.R. REP., 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 1444 (1970).
2. Pub.L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
3. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408, 21 U.S.C. §
848 (1976).
4. See infra note 5 for the definition of continuing criminal enterprise.
5. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408(a)(2)(A)-(B),
21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1976). The statute in its entirety reads as follows:
§848. Continuing criminal enterprise
(a) Penalties; forfeitures
(1) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and which may be up
to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $100,000, and to the forfeiture pre-
scribed in paragraph (2); except that if any person engages in such activity after one
or more prior convictions of him under this section have become final, he shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and which
may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $200,000, and to the
forfeiture provision in paragraph (2).
(2) Any person who is convicted under paragraph (1) of engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United States -
(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise, and
(B) any of his interest in, claim against, or property or contractual rights of
any kind affording a source of influence over, such enterprise.
(b) Continuing criminal enterprise defined
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise if -
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subehapter II of this chapter the
punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subehapter or
subchapter II of this chapter -
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a
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Problems of interpretation and application of the statute arise,
however, when an individual who has been indicted under section
848 transfers property, which would have been subject to forfei-
ture, to a third party before the indictment and the imposition of a
restraining order restricting the transfer of the property have been
obtained.s This comment will focus on the rights of all parties in-
volved when such a chain of events occurs. However, before such
an analysis can be undertaken, a proper foundation must be laid in
order to understand the routine application of the statute. Thus
this comment will first examine the CCE's purpose, its constitu-
tional ramifications and the standard application of its forfeiture
provisions. Finally, it will discuss the propriety of placing a re-
straining order on a third party.
II. THE PURPOSE OF CCE AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
RAMIFICATIONS
Essential to an analysis of the CCE7 is the statute's general pur-
pose. In enacting section 848, Congress intended to penalize the
organizers of large scale drug operations which were entered into
for profit.8 It is important to note that section 848 is only con-
cerned with the organizers of the enterprise and not the partici-
supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
(c) Suspension of sentence and probation prohibited
In the case of any sentence imposed under this section, imposition or execution of
such sentence shall not be suspended, probation shall not be granted, and section
4202 of title 18 and the Act of July 15, 1932 (D.C Code, secs. 24-203 - 24-207), shall
not apply.
(d) Jurisdiction of courts
The district courts of the United States (including courts in the territories or pos-
sessions of the United States having jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section)
shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such
other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connec-
tion with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as
they shall deem proper.
(Pub. L. 91-513, title II, § 408, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1265.)
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408, 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1976).
6. Id. § 408(d), 21 U.S.C. § 848(d). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute. The
United States district courts have jurisdiction to enter restraining orders against any prop-
erty which may be subject to forfeiture. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
7. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408, 21 U.S.C. §
848 (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
8. See supra text accompanying note 3. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.
1976), af'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
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pants.9 But, it is well recognized that there can be more than one
organizer in a criminal enterprise.10
Before a defendant can be convicted of violating section 848, the
government must allege and prove that the defendant was engaged
in a continuing series of narcotic sales in violation of federal law in
concert with five or .more people, that he occupied a management
or supervisory position and that he received substantial income
from such activity.11 In response to these prerequisites for convic-
tion under section 848, many defendants have launched constitu-
tional challenges against the CCE based on a void for vagueness
challenge."2 To date, however, none have been successful. 13 The
typical attack by a defendant juxtaposes a constitutional void for
vagueness argument in conjunction with an insufficiency of the evi-
9. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408(b)(2)(A), 21
U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(A) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute. See also United
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980) (section 848
is only concerned with organizers of criminal enterprises having five or more members).
10. See United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1642 (1982) (there can be more than one organizer in a criminal enterprise).
11. United States v. Samuelson, 697 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1983). Defendant Jay
Kenton Samuelson was convicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 848. He was the organizer in a
drug operation located in Fargo, North Dakota. The evidence indicated that his convictions
on numerous counts charging Federal drug violations constituted a continuing criminal en-
terprise, that he acted in concert with five or more persons and that he occupied a supervi-
sory or management position. 697 F.2d at 259.
12. See United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
857 (1981) (denying defendant's constitutional challenge based on the term "substantial in-
come"); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865
(1979) (upholding the constitutionality of the terms "continuing series of violations," "un-
dertaken in concert," "organizers . . .," and "substantial income"); United States v.
Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977) (adopting
the rationale that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague since the degree of violation
required by the statute is such that the defendant has to be on notice); United States v.
Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977); United States v.
Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1343-44 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975) (holding
that section 848 is not on its face unconstitutionally void for vagueness and was not void as
applied since evidence was produced to show that the defendant was a kingpin in a narcot-
ics operation); United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008
(1974) (holding that section 848 was not vague on its face or as applied in this particular
instance); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936
(1974); United States v. Suquet, 551 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that defendant's
void for vagueness challenge must fail since he only made a blanket assertion that section
848 was vague and did not assert that section 848 was vague as applied to the facts of the
particular case); United States v. Holman, 490 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that
although the statute in some instances may be vague as applied, it was not vague on its
face); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Del. 1976); United States v. Collier,
358 F. Supp. 1351 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d 327 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 831 (1974).
13. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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dence claim."' The courts have, however, foreclosed this method of
attack.' 5 If a defendant, nevertheless, still contemplates a constitu-
tional attack, in order to challenge the CCE as being vague, he
must challenge section 848 in light of the specific facts of the
case. 
8
Many defendants have attempted to attack the statute's facial
validity and have failed.' 7 This is not to say, however, that the
statute is immune from the possibility of being vague as applied.'"
The leading case cited for authority as to the statute's facial valid-
ity is United States v. Manfredi.'9 In Manfredi, the defendant was
indicted under section 848 for engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise. He was suspected of conducting one of the largest
(hard) drug operations in New York.20 The defendant was subse-
quently convicted and received a 30-year prison sentence and a
fine of one hundred thousand dollars.'
In an effort to gain acquittal, on appeal, Manfredi attempted to
assert that the CCE was unconstitutionally vague. 2 In deciding the
case, the court noted that before a person can be found to be en-
gaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, he must be engaged in
the business of trafficking large quantities of prohibited drugs on a
continuing basis in a supervisory position for which he obtains sub-
stantial income. 3 The court pointed out that the conduct required
for a conviction is of such a nature that, from a practical point of
14. See United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
857 (1981), in which the court noted this common method of attack.
15. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16. "[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment free-
doms must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand." United States v.
Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 550 (1975) and United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1277-78 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977)).
17. See United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
962 (1975); citing United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008
(1974) and United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
936 (1974).
18. United States v. Holman, 490 F. Supp. 755, 758 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing United
States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1970)). In
Valenzuela, the defendant, Jose Valenzuela, asserted that he was not adequately notified of
the illegality of his conduct based on the statute. After the court examined the statute as
applied in the defendant's unique set of facts, the court concluded that Jose had no valid
constitutional claim.
19. 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974).
20. Id. at 590.
21. Id. at 590, 591 n.2.
22. Id. at 602.
23. Id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
Vol. 22:171
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view, a defendant must be on notice that his conduct is wrongful
and illegal.24 Thus, the court stated that it is very difficult to assert
that the statute should be declared unconstitutionally vague. The
court in Manfredi did, however, concede that the statute could
have been more "artfully" drawn by Congress but noted that, as to
date, no one has proferred a better proposal.2 The court's consti-
tutional analysis of the statute has since become the standard for
interpretation of the CCE by other courts.26
In lieu of attacking the facial validity of the entire statute, many
defendants have attempted to attack particular words within the
statute on vagueness charges.27 The definitional section of the
CCE2 8 utilizes various general terms to define what constitutes a
continuing criminal enterprise.2 9 Within this section there are four
phrases which are consistently under attack as being vague: (1)
"part of a continuing series;"30 (2) "in concert;"' (3) "position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of manage-
ment; '32 and (4) "substantial income."" Although there are nu-
merous decisions which uphold the constitutionality of each of
these terms,3 ' the decision in United States v. Valenzuela 5 first
points out that the words under challenge cannot be looked at in
isolation, but rather must be analyzed in conjunction with each
24. 488 F.2d at 602.
25. Id. at 603. See also United States v. Collier, 493 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir. 1974)
adopting the exact text of Manfredi. However, see infra notes 122-24 and accompanying
text for a discussion of proposed changes.
26. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
28. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408(b), 21
U.S.C. § 848(b) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
29. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
30. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408(b)(2), 21
U.S.C. § 848(b)(2) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
31. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408(b)(2)(A),
21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(A) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
32. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 408(b)(2)(A),
21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(A) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
33. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 § 408(b)(2)(B), 21
U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(B) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
34. For definitions of these terms, see generally United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d
406, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977) (utilizing other courts' defini-
tions); United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
936 (1974); United States v. Collier, 358 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd per
curiam, 493 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974) (the court relied on
Webster's Dictionary to define "continuing series").
35. 596 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
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other and in light of their statutory context.3s Keeping this in
mind, the court construed the phrase "part of a continuing se-
ries" 87 to mean three or more federal drug violations;38 "in con-
cert" 9 to mean any agreement in a plan to accomplish the prohibi-
tions of section 848.40 "Position of organizer, a supervisory
position, or any other position of management ' 4 was to be deter-
mined by the day-to-day connotation ascribed to it in the business
community and general public.42 Finally, the court addressed the
phrase "substantial income."43 The court did not attempt to define
this term, but rather noted that the statute would be valid even if
this term was totally omitted from the statute." The court stated
that this term, in effect, protects small time operators from the
reach of section 848"" and, therefore, it is ludicrous for a defendant
to challenge the phrase as being constitutionally vague."
In light of the foregoing judicial interpretation of the statute, it
must be emphasized that when challenging a statute for vagueness,
particularly this statute, not every ambiguity will render it void for
vagueness.47 Further, to be convicted under section 848, the defen-
dant must commit a series of felony violations, each of which in-
volves specific intent.48 For a defendant to assert that he did not
know that what he was doing was unlawful borders on the
absurd."
36. Id. at 1367.
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
38. 596 F.2d at 1367.
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
40. 596 F.2d at 1367.
41. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42. 596 F.2d at 1367
43. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
44. 596 F.2d at 1368.
45. Id.
46. Id. Although this logic skirts the issue it is persuasive reasoning.
47. United States v. Collier, 358 F. Supp. 1351, 1353 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd per
curiarn, 493 F.2d 327 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974). The court expanded on
this idea noting that just because a statute's "exact parameters" may be somewhat ambigu-
ous, it does not mean that the statute cannot be constitutionally applied to conduct which is
"clearly within the bounds of the statute." Id. In other words, one should not assert that
there is a gray area until one is within that area.
48. United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588, 603 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
936 (1974). The defendant must have a preconceived criminal intent. Id.
49. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The statute has also withstood various
other constitutional attacks. See, e.g., United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp 1308 (D. Del.
1976) (section 848 does not deny a defendant equal protection nor does it constitute cruel
and unusual punishment). Nor has the statute presented a due process problem because the
courts construe the statute to avoid an unconstitutional outcome. Thus, as long as one is
176 Vol. 22:171
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III. TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF CCE
In enacting section 848, Congress intended to create a criminal
forfeiture statute.50 The categorization of the statute as a criminal
forfeiture statute must be emphasized because criminal forfeiture
statutes are different from civil forfeiture statutes.5' Civil forfei-
ture proceedings are in rem and the property itself is deemed to be
the offender.52 Such property may be proceeded against for that
granted a timely adversary hearing regarding the imposition of a restraining order or forfei-
ture, there is no violation of due process. See United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 245
(E.D. Cal. 1982).
50. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Since section 848 is
a criminal statute it will be strictly construed, and any ambiguity in interpretation will be
resolved in favor of leniency. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973).
51. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3rd Cir. 1981).
52. An excellent example of an in rem forfeiture statute is 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976). The
pertinent forfeiture subsections of § 881(a) read as follows:
§ 881. Forfeitures
(a)Property subject
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no prop-
erty right shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distrib-
uted, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are
used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation
of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for
property described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are
used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property
described in paragraph (1) or (2), except that-
(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the
transaction of business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under
the provisions of this section unless it shall appear that the owner or
other person in charge of such conveyance was a consenting party or
privy to a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chap-
ter; and
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this
section by reason of any act or omission established by the owner
thereof to have been committed or omitted by any person other than
such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in the possession
of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of
the United States, or of any State.
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm,
tapes, and data which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this
subchapter.
Id.
As will be noted, this statute is concerned with only the property itself and not the per-
sonal guilt or innocence of the individual defendant. This statement is not only verified by
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reason alone and the guilt or innocence of the owner is of no conse-
quence. 8 Criminal forfeiture proceedings on the other hand are in
personam.54 The personal guilt or innocence of the defendant is
the main point of inquiry. 5 The purpose of a statute of this type,
and specifically section 848, is to penalize the defendant by requir-
ing the forfeiture of all profits derived from the criminal enter-
prise.5" The statute specifically authorizes forfeiture of any profit
or interest derived from a continuing criminal enterprise.5 7 Since
the statute only speaks of the government's entitlement to forfei-
ture as of the date of conviction, Congress gave the district courts
the power to impose pre-conviction restraining orders to prohibit
the transfer of property which may be subject to forfeiture.5 8
The statute only speaks in generalities regarding restraining or-
ders and does not provide any guidelines for their issuance.
Through judicial interpretation, however, certain guidelines have
evolved. The government may initially seek, and the court may is-
sue, an ex parte restraining order which restrains the property
thought to be forfeitable.5' This order, however, can only be of
brief duration and cannot be perpetuated until a defendant's trial
unless the defendant is afforded an adversary hearing in which the
propriety of the ex parte order can be examined.60 In examining
the order at an adversary hearing, there are certain guidelines and
the statute's plain interpretation but is quite evident from the cases arising under § 881.
See, e.g., United States v. One 1945 Douglas (C-54-DC-4) Aircraft, 461 F. Supp. 324 (1978);
United States v. One 1973 Volvo, 377 F. Supp. 810 (1974).
53. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
54. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3rd Cir. 1981); United States v. Veon,
538 F. Supp. 237, 242 (E.D. Cal. 1982); United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D.
Md. 1976).
55. See cases cited supra note 54.
56. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 848(d) (1976). See supra note 5 for the text of the statute. This section
was designed to circumvent the possibility of frustrating the effectiveness of the statute's
forfeiture provision by transferring the property before conviction. United States v. Long,
654 F.2d at 915.
59. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 240 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Although the stat-
ute does not specifically authorize a restraining order, the courts have determined that such
an order is necessary since a defendant who has been indicted will have notice that the
government will seek forfeiture of certain property. Id. at 243. United States v. Long, 654
F.2d 911, 915 (3rd Cir. 1981). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2).
60. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 240 (E.D. Cal. 1982). See United States v.
Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982) (it was error for a court to deny a defendant an
adversary hearing after the issuance of an ex parte order). See also Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which dictates that an immediate hearing be had whenever a court
has granted a temporary ex parte restraining order. Fan. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
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procedures which must be followed.6 1 Since Congress left unan-
swered questions such as what must be proven, who has the bur-
den of proof, and what evidence may be admissible, the answers
have had to evolve through the judiciary. The court in United
States v. Long,6 2 pioneered the establishment of the appropriate
standard for issuing a restraining order under section 848(d), stat-
ing that:
Before a court can issue such a restraining order, however, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that it is likely to convince a jury, beyond a reason-
able doubt, of two things: one, that the defendant is guilty of violating the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute and two, that the profits or proper-
ties at issue are subject to forfeiture under the provisions of section
848(a)(2).
63
Although other courts have adopted this standard verbatim,64 the
district court in United States v. Veon" added a very important
caveat, cautioning that one should not confuse what the govern-
ment must prove with its burden of persuasion." While the Long
standard is what the government must prove at the hearing, the
government's burden of persuasion for obtaining the issuance of a
restraining order is only a preponderance of the evidence,6" 7 a de-
termination that the court in Long failed to note. The court in
Veon added still another dimension to the procedural criteria of an
adversary hearing under section 848. Since the court in Long failed
to address what evidence may be introduced at the hearing to ob-
tain a restraining order, the court in Veon reasoned that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence apply in such a proceeding and should be
followed."
Thus, based on judicial interpretation, the procedures to be fol-
61. The courts themselves note that there is a paucity of law on the guidelines to be
followed under CCE third party forfeitures. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 916 (3rd
Cir. 1981); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 240 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
62. 654 F.2d 911 (3rd Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 915.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982).
65. 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
66. Id. at 246.
67. Id. at 247.
68. United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 249 (E.D. Cal. 1982). The court noted
that since Rule 1101(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that the rules "apply gener-
ally to all criminal cases and proceedings" they apply here also. There is no exception to the
rule which would dictate their nonapplication. 538 F. Supp. at 249. It should be noted that,
although the rule barring hearsay is applicable, the court in Long relied almost entirely on
hearsay in reaching its decision. Evidently the defendant's counsel did not object to such
evidence, so it was admitted. Id.
1983
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lowed in obtaining a restraining order are as follows. First, a court
may issue an ex parte restraining order of brief duration."9 The
defendant is then entitled to an adversary hearing70 governed by
the Federal Rules of Evidence, in which the government has the
burden of proof.7 At the hearing, if the government does not prove
by a preponderance of the evidence73 that the defendant will be
found guilty at trial of violating section 848 and that the restrained
property is subject to forfeiture under section 848, the ex parte
restraining order will be dissolved.
IV. EFFECT OF CCE's FORFEITURE PROVISION ON THIRD PARTIES
An intriguing question arises when an individual, who has been
indicted under section 848, transfers property, which might be sub-
ject to forfeiture, to a third party before the indictment and impo-
sition of a restraining order. The consequences of such a transac-
tion were examined by the Third Circuit in United States v.
Long.75 That decision, however, can at best be said to be an errone-
ous interpretation of section 848.6
In United States v. Long, the defendant, Thomas E. Long,
transferred an aircraft to his attorneys for payment of past and
future legal fees.7 7 Six months after the transfer,78 Long was in-
dicted under section 848 and the district court issued an ex parte
restraining order, pursuant to section 848(d), which in effect pre-
vented Long and his attorneys from transferring the aircraft.7 ' In
challenging the order at the subsequent adversary hearing, the at-
69. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75. 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
76. Ironically, the Long decision espouses the accepted standard for the issuance of
restraining orders under section 848(d). See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
77. 654 F.2d at 913. The defendant Long sold the airplane to his attorneys pursuant to
an oral contract in which the purchase price of the plane was $140,000. The terms of the
sale were as follows: the attorneys gave defendant Long $31,000 in cash, $30,000 of past legal
debts were expunged and $79,000 was credited to the defendant's account for his upcoming
prosecution under section 848. Fifty thousand dollars of the $79,000 was a retainer and
$29,000 was for future legal expenses. 654 F.2d at 913.
78. 654 F.2d at 916. See infra note 95 for further discussion about the transfer.
79. 654 F.2d at 912. The attorneys were also required to post a $400,000 interim bond.
Id. Requiring a bond seems to be an excessive precaution since § 848(d) speaks of re-
straining orders and performance bonds as a "one or the other" type of remedy. See supra
note 5 for the text of the statute.
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torneys unsuccessfully asserted that such a restraining order was
improper since they were neither indicted under section 848 nor
connected with the illegal enterprise in which Long was allegedly
involved.80 In upholding the restraining order, the Third Circuit
noted that the "restraining order simply preserves the status quo
pending Long's eventual trial and final determination pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e)." 81 The court further
theorized that the purpose of section 848 should not be frustrated
by permitting a defendant to dispose of "illegal proceeds" which
may be subject to forfeiture to a knowing third party.8" Although
this rationale has superficial appeal, it is questionable if such a
finding is logically sound in light of section 848, its purpose, and
other case law interpreting the statute.
As a basic starting point in examining the propriety of the Long
rationale, it is helpful to keep in mind just what interest the gov-
ernment possesses in property which may be found to be forfeita-
ble. Under section 848(a)(2), 83 conviction is the only time that the
government has a right to forfeiture.84 It is a basic principle that
the government has no right to assert a claim in a piece of property
which may subsequently be held to be forfeitable, since the guilt of
the defendant has not yet been determined.85 This is the situation
in Long. The defendant is a fugitive from justice and a jury deter-
mination of his guilt or innocence, which would enable the govern-
ment to seek forfeiture, is not in the foreseeable future." Thus, in
Long, it can be concluded that the government had no legitimate
interest in the airplane which would enable them to prohibit the
transfer of the plane prior to the indictment.8 "
80. 654 F.2d at 912.
81. Id. at 915. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) reads as follows: "If the in-
dictment of the information alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfei-
ture, a special verdict shall be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to
forfeiture, if any." FED. R.CRIM. P. 31(e).
82. 654 F.2d at 916. It must be remembered that under section 848 only the profits are
forfeitable and not any specific piece of property as in in rem forfeitures. If the profits are
no longer entangled in the property, but merely pass through the property, the government
is not entitled to forfeiture. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
84. "[T]he Government possesses an interest in a given piece of property only to the
extent to which that property is the embodiment of illicit 'profits,' and that the Govern-
ment's interest does not arise until the personal guilt of the property's owner has been es-
tablished." United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 280 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
85. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
86. As of July 25, 1983, the defendant Long is still a fugitive.
87. See infra note 94 and accompanying text for the Third Circuit's subsequent expla-
nation of this observation.
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The statute by itself is of little help in examining such a compli-
cated issue. In examining the propriety of the Long decision, it is
most helpful to read the statute in light of the case law which in-
terprets it to determine what effect section 848 has on a transferee
when the property has been obtained from an indicted transferor
and when the transfer took place prior to the indictment and im-
position of a restraining order.
The facts of United States v. Veon,s a case decided by the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of California, have the same
practical impact as the factual situation in Long. In Veon, the gov-
ernment obtained an ex parte restraining order pursuant to section
848(d).8 9 The government subsequently refused to submit admissi-
ble evidence during the adversary hearing which would support the
restraining order, so the court ordered it dissolved.90 In an attempt
to do indirectly what the court could not do directly, the govern-
ment filed a notice of lis pendens.9' The court subsequently ex-
punged the lis pendens notice filed by the government noting that,
even if a transferee had notice,92 he would not be subject to the
outcome of the defendant's trial."' If this is accepted as true, the
Long court's observation that the "punitive purposes [of the stat-
ute] should not be frustrated by allowing a defendant to transfer
the illegal proceeds to a knowing third party"9 4 is an inaccurate
application of section 848.91 In arriving at its decision, the court in
Veon provided an in-depth analysis which substantially supple-
ments and clarifies the Long court's pioneering efforts. The Veon
decision even alludes to the fact that a different result could be
88. 549 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
89. Id. at 275. See supra note 5 for the text of the statute.
90. 549 F. Supp. at 275.
91. Id. at 276. In effect a lis pendens serves a notice to the world that a defendant's
real property may be subject to forfeiture. Id.
92. A transferee with notice of the filing of lis pendens is a purchaser pendente lite. Id.
93. Id. at 279.
94. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d at 916. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
95. As the court in Veon points out, the Government does not have an interest in
property which has been transferred legitimately. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. at
282. If a transfer occurs, the profits are not longer embodied in the transferred property,
they have taken some other form. Once the profits are no longer contained in a certain piece
of property, the property is no longer subject to forfeiture by the government. Id. This is
assuming, however, that there is a valid transfer of the property in question. In Long, al-
though the court alluded to the possibility of the transfer being questionable, they never
found explicity that the transfer was fraudulent. They instead relied on the unsound ration-
ale that a defendant should not be able to "escape the penalty sought to be imposed by
Congress simply by transferrring his illgotten profits to a non-indicted third party." United




In light of section 848 and the Veon court's analysis, it is illogi-
cal in Long to assume that the government has an interest in the
aircraft which would supersede the interest asserted by Long's at-
torneys, because the plane was transferred before the indictment
and restraining order, regardless of the fact that the attorneys sub-
sequently had notice of the indictment.9 7 This rationale is both
logical and consistent with the purposes of section 848, but as evi-
denced in the Veon decision, the Veon court was momentarily
stymied by the apparent opposite result of the court's decision in
Long." In an effort to rectify the Long court's decision, the Veon
court searched for the "latent holding" within the Long court's lit-
eral holding in order to arrive at a consistent interpretation of sec-
tion 848." The court was quick to caution that Long should not be
read to hold that property which was owned by a defendant prior
to his conviction but which is at the time of conviction wholly
owned by an unindicted third party, may be subject to forfeiture
under section 848.100 The court stated that such forfeiture would
be "doctrinally unsound."10' Although the court in Veon recog-
nized the possible misinterpretation of Long by other courts, the
practical result of Long in fact perpetuates the doctrinally unsound
result cautioned against by the court in Veon.'" 2 The attorneys
were and have been the registered owners of the subject aircraft
prior to the ex parte restraining order. Yet, they have been en-
joined from transferring the aircraft for a period in excess of two
96. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. at 282. See infra note 99 and accompanying
text.
97. A finding to the contrary would confuse the concept of profits versus product as
discussed in Veon, 549 Supp. at 282. If the government were allowed to impose a restraining
order on property which is sold prior to the indictment, the government could seek forfei-
ture of everything through which the profits once passed, a clearly "absurd" result. Id.
98. Id. at 281.
99. Id. at 282. The Veon court noted that the Long court's observation that the
"punative purposes [of the statute] should not be frustrated by allowing a defendant to
transfer illegal proceeds to a knowing third party," id. at 282 (quoting United States v.
Long, 654 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1981)), should not be read to hold "that property which
formerly belonged to the defendant-but which is wholly owned by uncharged third parties
at the time of conviction-may be subject to forfeiture under section 848(a)(2)." 549 F.
Supp. at 282. Although Veon cautioned against such an unsound interpretation, the un-
sound interpretation is, in effect, the holding which evolved from Long in light of the Third
Circuit's subsequent decision when the attorneys later sought modification of the restraining
order. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
100. 549 F. Supp. at 282.
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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years based on the dual rationale that the restraining order pre-
served the status quo pending Long's trial, and that the purposes
of section 848 should not be frustrated by permitting a defendant
to dispose of illegal proceeds which may be subject to forfeiture to
a knowing third party.'0 3
It is difficult to reconcile the restraint on alienation which the
Third Circuit perpetuates in the Long decision. Utilizing the prin-
ciples set forth in Veon, the Long court's decision can only logi-
cally be interpreted to mean that the court was operating under a
misconception of the purpose and application of section 848 which
is readily ascertainable from the court's opinion. For example, the
Long court explicitly rejected the attorneys' contention that sec-
tion 848 can only apply to profits or properties in which a defen-
dant maintains an interest at the time the restraining order is is-
sued.104 This conclusion is contrary to the result reached in Veon,
the purposes of section 848,105 and the nature of in personam for-
feiture. 10 6 It must be remembered that in Veon, after dissolving
the ex parte restraining order, the court declared that even if a
transferee acquired an interest in a defendant's property subse-
quent to the dissolved restraining order, the transferee would not
be subject to forfeiture.0 7 Although Veon and Long seemed to be
irreconcilable, the court in Veon made an attempt to justify the
Long court's decision by asserting that the Lorfg court was operat-
ing under the assumption that the defendant still possessed an in-
terest in the aircraft at the time of the restraining order, and that
the court was fearful that if the aircraft were transferred, the prof-
its which represented the defendant's interest would be transferred
into an unreachable interest. 08
The court in Veon stated that the attorneys could seek modifica-
tion of the restraining order based on the terms of the transfer of
the aircraft. 0 9 The Veon court, utilizing the principles of the Cali-
fornia Rules of Professional Conduct, 110 suggested that defendant
103. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
104. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d911, 916 (3d Cir. 1981).
105. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
107. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 279 (E.D. Cal. 1982). It would logically
follow then that even if Veon transferred property after his indictment but before the impo-
sition of a restraining order, the transfer would be valid and not subject to forfeiture under
section 848(a)(2).
108. 549 F. Supp. at 282. See supra note 77 for the breakdown of the sales transaction.
109. 549 F. Supp. at 284 n.20.
110. Id. at 283 n.18.
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Long possessed an equitable interest of twenty-nine thousand dol-
lars in the plane, which would be subject to forfeiture, thus enti-
tling the government to restrain the entire plane." ' The court
noted, however, that the plane could be sold, and twenty-nine
thousand dollars of the purchase price-Long's interest-could be
placed in escrow subject to a restraining order.1 12 Such a modifica-
tion would be consistent with the Veon opinion and salvage the
Long court's decision. The fact remains, nonetheless, that at no
time did the Long court attempt to establish the fractional interest
that Long had in the plane. The court consistently referred to the
plane as a "whole," being subject to forfeiture."1 ' The court in
Veon gave the Long court the benefit of the doubt and observed
that the court in Long was tacitly referring to the defendant's in-
terest in the plane. 4 This rationale is a logical interpretation of
the Long court's decision. However, in light of the attorneys' sub-
sequent attempt to modify the restraining order and the decision
which resulted, the Veon court's observation is erroneous.'
1 5
In an order denying modification of the restraining order, Judge
Zeigler, sitting by designation on the Third Circuit, "rehashed the
logic which the Long Court's decision was based upon.""'0 In effect
this patently revives the "doctrinally unsound" result that the
Veon court cautioned against."17 Judge Zeigler further contributed
to the initial decision's misinterpretation of section 848 by utilizing
the logic of a civil in rem forfeiture statute to arrive at his decision
in a case which involved a criminal in personam forfeiture
111. Id. RULEs oF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Rule 2-
111(a)(3) reprinted in 23 pt. 2 CAL. CrcVI AND CRIMINAL CODE Rule 2-111(a)(3) (West 1981),
in effect states that a true retainer is not refundable but sums advanced for expenses are.
Id.
112. 549 F. Supp. at 284 n.20.
113. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981).
114. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 284 (E.D. Cal. 1982). The court in Veon
stressed that if the Long opinion is read as assuming that the defendant still had a frac-
tional interest in the plane, which was the embodiment of illegal profits, the Long opinion
presents no difficulties such as assuming that the government had an interest superior to the
attorneys. Id.
115. In an Order of Court dated June 29, 1983, District Judge Zeigler of the Third
Circuit, sitting by designation, made a specific finding that, "If the United States sustains
its burden of proving that the aircraft is properly subject to forfeiture because it was pur-
chased with profits from a continuing criminal enterprise. . . the alleged contractual claim
of movants is subordinated to the right of the United States." United States v. Long, Crimi-
nal Action No. 80-89-B, slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. June 29, 1983).
116. See id. at 2.




It must be emphasized that the forfeiture provision of section
848 does not utilize the forfeiture of any specific piece of property,
i.e., the aircraft, but only authorizes the forfeiture of profits which
can be attributed to a convicted felon.119 The government does
have a right, however, to trace the profits into whatever form in
which they are embodied at the time they become forfeitable. If
the property no longer constitutes profits of the criminal enter-
prise, the government has no claim to the property.2 0 This is ap-
parently what the court in Long failed to recognize, and instead,




In light of the subsequent decision handed down by Judge
Zeigler of the Third Circuit, the Long and Veon decisions, which
were previously reconcilable, are now at opposite ends of the
spectrum.
The next court which confronts a situation in which an indicted
transferor transfers property to a third party before the indictment
under section 848 and imposition of a restraining order, must pro-
ceed cautiously in reaching a logical outcome. In deciding, it must
be remembered that even though Long set forth the appropriate
standard for a restraining order, it neglected to determine the
proper burden of persuasion, and the proper evidence which can be
admitted, and utilized an in rem civil forfeiture statute in an in
personam criminal proceeding while failing to recognize a twin in
118. Judge Zeigler cited a case in his opinion which involved 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976), an
in rem forfeiture statute. United States v. Long, Criminal Action No. 80-89-B, slip. op. at 3
(3d. Cir. June 19, 1983). See also supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text. Utilization of
the logic of this statute is not only inappropriate but perplexing in light of the Third Cir-
cuit's refusal to extend the logic of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO),
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976), a "brother" criminal forfeiture statute to CCE. United States
v. Long, 654 F.2d at 915 n.6. The Long court would not recognize RICO since it applied only
to the defendant's personal interest in an enterprise. The CCE statute applies to profits. Id.
However, there is one case under RICO which holds that interest does include profits. See
United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom., Russello v.
United States, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983). Although the Supreme Court of the United States has
granted certiorari to resolve the issue, it is still perplexing why a court would recognize an in
rem civil forfeiture statute in an in personam criminal proceeding as opposed to a similar in
personam criminal forfeiture statute. For an in-depth discussion of RICO, see Tarlow, RICO
Revised, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983).
119. United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274, 289 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
120. Id. at 281.
121. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Vol. 22:171
1983 Continuing Criminal Enterprise
personam criminal forfeiture statute.12 The Veon court, on the
other hand, seems to be the more logical and persuasive of the two
opinions. Comparing and contrasting these two cases, although
helpful to analyzing section 848, does not provide the guidance
which courts, defendant's, and counsel would like to have in order
to arrive at rational decisions under section 848. A Report of the
Comptroller General of the United States12 advocated that Con-
gress should take action to clarify and strengthen criminal forfei-
ture statutes,124 and even proposed new legislation which would
amend certain sections of 848 to clarify the ambiguities which are
now inherent in section 848.125 In light of the two divergent deci-
sions handed down by the District Court for the Eastern District
of California and the Third Circuit, such a recommendation would
seem to be the only practical method to clarify section 848, unless
the Supreme Court grants certiorari.1
2 6
John Anthony Gill
122. See supra note 118.
123. ASSET FORFEITURE - SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATING DRUG TRAFFICKING: GAO
Report B-198-049 (April 10, 1981).
124. The report recognized four problem areas in criminal forfeiture statutes:
1) The scope of forfeiture authority is too narrow.
2) Forfeitures under RICO are limited by some to not include profits.
3) The extent to which assets must be traced is unclear.
4) Transfers of assets prior to conviction limits the effectiveness of forfeiture (empha-
sis added).
Id. at 30.
125. The Comptroller General recommended that section 848(a)(2) be amended to
read "(A) the profits obtained by him in such enterprise, including any profits and proceeds,
regardless of the form in which held, that are acquired, derived, used, or maintained indi-
rectly or directly, in connection with or as a result of a violation of paragraph (1)" GAO
Report B-198-049, supra note 123, at 57. The Comptroller further proposed that a new sec-
tion, be added to read:
(E) To the extent that assets, interest, profits and proceeds forfeitable under this
section (1) cannot be located; (2) have been transferred, sold to, or deposited with
third parties; or (3) have been placed beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, the Court, upon conviction of the individual charged, may direct forfeiture of
such other assets of the defendant as may be available, limited in value to those as-
sets that would otherwise be forfeited under sub-section (a) of this section. Upon
petition of the defendant, the court may authorize redemption of assets forfeited
under this subsection provided the assets described in subsection (a) are surrendered
or otherwise remitted by such defendant to the juris of the court.
Id.
126. To date, the issue has not been petitioned to the Supreme Court.

